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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 
Assessing National Human Rights 
Performance: A Theoretical Framework* 
jack Donnelly 
Rhoda E. Howard 
Comparative quantitative assessment of human rights is hampered by the 
length of the list of internationally recognized rights. Not only is the list so 
long that it is hard to imagine gathering adequate data without an army of 
researchers (the International Human Rights Covenants contain more than 
thirty substantive articles, encompassing at least twice as many separate 
rights), but the results of such a comprehensive effort would almost certainly 
be overwhelming and bewildering in their complexity. In this article we try 
to narrow the list of rights concerning which it is necessary to gather data 
by establishing a theoretical framework for assessing a state's human rights 
performance. We identify a relatively small set of ten essential rights that 
separately are intrinsically essential and together provide good proxies for 
almost all other rights. An assessment of national performance on these ten 
rights, we argue, will approximate a comprehensive assessment of a country's 
overall human rights record. 
A "SHORT-LIST" OF RIGHTS 
Our "short list" of ten rights can be grouped into four categories: 
* "Survival" rights, which guarantee individual existence: rights to life, 
food and health care. 
* 
"Membership" rights, which assure one an equal place in society: 
family rights and the prohibition of discrimination. 
* We thank Philip Alston, Peter Baehr, David Forsythe, James Hathaway, William Keech, Bert 
Lockwood, Kim Nossal, Cranford Pratt, Kathleen Pritchard, John Vincent, Jane Vock, Claude 
Welch, James White and Gordon Whitaker for comments on an earlier draft. 
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* "Protection" rights, which guard the individual against abuses of power 
by the state: rights to habeas corpus and an independent judiciary. 
* 
"Empowerment" rights, which provide the individual with control 
over the course of his or her life, and in particular, control over (not merely 
protection against) the state: rights to education, a free press, and freedom 
of association. 
This list implies no hierarchy of rights. Quite the contrary, a recurring 
theme in what follows is the interdependence of all human rights. Survival 
rights, listed first, are no more, and no less, basic or important than em- 
powerment rights, listed last. Although no rights can be enjoyed unless one 
is alive, the right to life has no moral priority; it may be a prerequisite to 
enjoying other rights, but that does not make it a "higher" right. Likewise, 
although we argue below that a free press and freedom of association are 
most effective in securing political guarantee of other rights, that gives these 
rights at most a political, not a moral priority. Furthermore, these ten rights 
are not necessarily more important than other human rights For example, 
we argue that family rights, a free press, and freedom of association can 
stand as proxies for the right to religion, but this does not imply that they 
are of higher moral value. 
We claim only a methodological priority for these rights: taken together 
they can stand as measures of performance for virtually the entire list of 
internationally recognized human rights. Because of certain logical, political, 
and moral linkages among the rights discussed below, we contend that a 
state which protects these rights probably will be found to protect most other 
human rights as well. If this is true, national assessments will be greatly 
simplified. Such simplification, and the more coherent direction it can pro- 
vide to research, is the ultimate aim and justification of our theoretical work 
here. 
Clearly our project implies acceptance of the cross-national normative 
consensus represented by the International Bill of Human Rights (the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights [1948] and the International Human 
Rights Covenants [1966]). For practical purposes, the endorsement of this 
list by virtually all states, whatever their shortcomings in living up to its 
demands, precludes using any other list. Fortunately, the list is a remarkably 
good one. It includes a wide range of civil and political as well as economic, 
social, and cultural rights. Furthermore, as we have argued elsewhere' the 
full list can easily be derived from the principles of autonomy and moral 
equality and it provides a plausible account of the prerequisites of a life of 
dignity-at least in comtemporary state societies, which will be our exclusive 
focus here. The International Bill of Human Rights may not be complete or 
1. Rhoda E. Howard and Jack Donnelly, "Human Dignity, Human Rights and Political Re- 
gimes," American Political Science Review 80 (September 1986): 805-806. 
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fully adequate (e.g., nonarbitrary capital punishment is allowed and the 
rights of homosexuals are not guaranteed) but, henceforth, we will treat it 
as specifying the rights that must be encompassed in any comprehensive 
assessment of national practices. 
In addition to its intrinsic significance, this project is important because 
of the role human rights assessments have come to play in foreign and 
domestic policy. A number of Western countries, such as the United States, 
Norway, and the Netherlands,2 now tie foreign aid more or less closely to 
human rights performance, and the general tenor of relations can be greatly 
affected by perceptions of a country's human rights practices. No less im- 
portantly, a country's own human rights practices can raise major domestic 
political issues. Assessments based on information systematically gathered 
and presented according to a sound theoretical framework may allow pol- 
icymakers the opportunity to take into account most of the essential infor- 
mation. 
Quantitative indicators and evaluative assessments of various sorts are 
already being demanded, produced and used, and in the United States at 
least, have been formally incorporated into the foreign policy process.3 Social 
scientists thus have an obligation to provide analysts and policymakers with 
the clearest possible indicators. The essential first step in this process is the 
identification of a manageable, theoretically defensible set of human rights 
with which to assess national human rights practices.4 
2. See, for example, Tor Skalnes and Jan Egeland, ed., Human Rights in Developing Countries 
1986 (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986); and Peter Baehr, "Concern for Devel- 
opment Aid and Fundamental Human Rights: The Dilemma Faced by the Netherlands," 
Human Rights Quarterly 4 (Spring 1982): 39-52. 
3. Judith Innes de Neufville, "Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An Examination of 
the State Department Country Reports," Human Rights Quarterly 8 (November 1986): 681- 
699; and Gloria Valencia-Weber and Robert J. Weber, "El Salvador: Methods Used to 
Document Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 8 (November 1986), 731-770. 
4. We are particularly troubled by the tendencies in the recent literature on measuring human 
rights to use arbitrary definitions and to make questionable use of data developed for other 
purposes. For example, David L. Banks ("The Analysis of Human Rights Data Over Time," 
Human Rights Quarterly 8 [November 1986]: 654-655) claims to be talking about human 
rights but in fact simply takes "political freedom" to be equivalent to human rights without 
providing any argument at all. Kenneth A. Bollen ("Political Rights and Political Liberties 
in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures," Human Rights Quarterly 8 [Novem- 
ber 1986]: 567-591) advocates use of his political democracy index, developed for other 
purposes, although the link between this index and internationally recognized human rights 
remains obscure. The use of the PQLI (Physical Quality of Life Index) as a general measure 
of economic and social rights performance (see, for example, Kathleen Pritchard, "Com- 
parative Human Rights: An Integrative Explanation," Policy Studies Journal 15 [September 
1986]: 110-122) also is troublesome, because the variables included in the measure are 
strongly intercorrelated; it does not measure distributional inequalities in a society; and it 
is only vaguely linked to internationally accepted human rights. For a good review of 
problems in measuring human rights performance, especially with data gathered for other 
purposes, see Robert Justin Goldstein, "The Limitation of Using Quantitative Data in 
Studying Human Rights Abuses," Human Rights Quarterly 8 (November 1986): 607-627. 
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TABLE 1 
Survival Rights 
Right to Proxy for 
LIFE (D3, C6) Torture (D5, C7) 
FOOD (D25, E11) Property (D17) 
HEALTH CARE (D25, E12) Social Security (D22, E9) 
Mothers and Children (D25) 
Note: The source of each right in the International Bill of Human Rights is indicated in paren- 
theses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E = 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights). 
The following four sections examine in detail our ten key rights. Each 
section begins with a brief discussion of the general importance of that 
category of human rights and a table that specifies the sources of each right 
in the Covenants and the Universal Declaration and indicates the other rights 
for which it can be used as a proxy. Each right is then discussed, with 
attention given to its intrinsic importance, the ways it may stand for rights 
not included on the short list, and its interaction with other rights. Finally, 
we discuss a handful of internationally recognized human rights that are not 
adequately encompassed by our short list. 
SURVIVAL RIGHTS 
Because survival is prerequisite to all other human rights, rights that guarantee 
survival must be included in any short list of human rights. We have identified 
three key survival rights: the right to life, which we interpret as a right to 
protection against death at the hands of another (especially the state); the 
right to food, the right to the minimum supplies of sustenance; and the right 
to health care. These rights, and the rights for which they may be deemed 
proxies are set out in Table 1. 
The Right to Life 
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states 
that "every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." The right 
to life, expressed in similar terms in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration, 
is probably the single least controversial human right--in theory. In practice, 
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however, it is regularly, often flagrantly and systematically, violated. Leo 
Kuper has argued, with some justification, that "[the right to life] is one of 
the most abused of human rights-abused above all by governments, the 
political custodians and protectors of human rights."5 
Some commentators argue for a very broad interpretation of the right 
to life as encompassing numerous other rights explicitly recognized else- 
where in the International Bill.6 We prefer to stick closely to the words of 
the Covenant and focus on legal protection against arbitrary deprivations of 
life. This requires state guarantees of minimal conditions of social order, 
protection against private murders, and protection against execution by the 
state or its agents. 
Social order is often taken for granted, but when it breaks down even 
the framework for existence collapses. Life, however, does not simply de- 
generate into an atomistic war of all against all. Rather, organized elements, 
often more or less closely attached to the state or its remnants, are loosed 
on society, placing the lives of individuals at risk not so much from their 
neighbors as from gangs of armed men who replace legitimate social order 
with personal rule based on force. In an extreme case, such as contemporary 
Lebanon, the state gives way to ethnic, religious, and political private mili- 
tias.7 Protection against such a world requires a state capable of untempered 
and illegitimate use of force, providing law and order. Life can be guaranteed 
only when the "politics" of force and terror is replaced by more or less 
legitimate political order. 
In addition to providing minimal social order, the right to life requires 
the state to protect individuals against attacks on their person either by fellow 
citizens or the state and its agents. Laws prohibiting murder and violent 
assaults are necessary, along with a judiciary and police force capable of 
enforcing such prohibitions. 
The state must also assure that its own officials or agents are prevented 
from killing civilians (and each other).8 In recent years, such killing has taken 
5. Leo Kuper, "Genocide and Mass Killing: Illusion and Reality," in The Right to Life in 
International Law, ed. B. G. Ramcharan (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985). 
6. See, for example, B. G. Ramcharan, "The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life," 
in Ramcharan ed., note 5 above. 
7. Douglas duCharme, "Lebanon," in International Handbook on Human Rights, ed. Jack 
Donnelly and Rhoda E. Howard (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987). 
8. Although Article 6 of the Civil and Political Covenant does explicitly allow capital pun- 
ishment in limited circumstances-an allowance underscored by the prohibition only of 
"arbitrary" deprivations of life-we would argue that considerations of morality and logical 
consistency require prohibiting judicial as well as extrajudicial executions. Even in cases 
of the most heinous crimes, we would argue that simple logical consistency requires 
prohibition even of nonarbitrary, judicially sanctioned executions. The idea of human 
rights-equal and inalienable rights held by each person simply as a human being-implies 
an inherent and irreducible moral value in each person that the state must respect. The 
death penalty, even if applied "fairly," is morally problematic because of its complete and 
final denial of this value. Ongoing discussions concerning the drafting of a Second Optional 
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on gruesome new forms, as witnessed by the rise of death squads and 
"disappearances" in Latin America and elsewhere, and the practice of "sal- 
vaging" in the Philippines.9 These have not, however, supplanted more 
conventional practices of mass murder and genocide. In addition to relatively 
well reported cases such as Kampuchea (1975-78), and the excesses of 
dictators such as Bokassa in the Central African "Empire" or Macias Nguema 
in Equatorial Guinea, there are numerous other examples, such as the sys- 
tematic massacres of Indians in Paraguay and Guatemala, and two waves 
of horrible mass murders in less than twenty years in Indonesia: in 1965 
through 1966, when roughly half a million leftists were killed, and in the 
late seventies and early eighties, when at least one-quarter, and probably 
closer to half, of the population of East Timor died when it was forcibly 
incorporated into Indonesia.'1 Significant numbers of official and quasi- 
official murders have occurred in literally dozens of other countries.11 
No guarantee of the right to life can ever be absolutely certain. Neverthe- 
less, a state that does not take action to prevent murder and violent crime 
is not discharging its responsibilities with respect to the right to life. For 
example, the failure of the government to prosecute a single person for the 
disappearance and death of even one of the tens of thousands of Salvadoran 
victims of death squads, and the failure of some urban police forces in the 
United States to provide adequate protection to selected neighborhoods and 
public housing projects, represent clear violations of the right of life. 
The right to life requires actual as well as legislative protection. In some 
cases, scarcity of resources may take the prevention of certain kinds of 
violations too costly for the state to act effectively. For example, at some 
point the marginal utility of increased police protection becomes so small 
Protocol to the Covenant prohibiting capital punishment (See U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights Resolution 1987/104 and UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/20) may indicate a turn 
of international law and opinion in this direction. 
9. See Amnesty International USA, Disappearances: A Workbook (New York: Amnesty In- 
ternational, 1981); Edy Kaufman and Patricia Weiss Fagen, "Extrajudicial Executions: An 
Insight into the Global Dimensions of a Human Rights Violation," Human Rights Quarterly 
3 (November 1981): 81-100; Richard P. Claude, "The Philippines," in Donnelly and 
Howard ed., note 7 above; and Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, UN document E/CN.4/1987/15. 
10. Eric Wolf, "Murder of the Ache," in Genocide in Paraguay, ed. Philip Arens (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1976); Gordon L. Bowen, "The Political Economy of State Ter- 
rorism: Barrier to Human Rights in Guatemala," in Human Rights and Third World De- 
velopment, ed. George W. Shepherd and Ved P. Nanda (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1985). A. Kohen and J. Taylor, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor 
(London: TAPOL, 1979); James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed (Milton, Qld: Jacaranda, 
1983); and C. Budiardjo and L. Liong, The War Against East Timor (London: Zed Press, 
1984). 
11. See, for example, Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, ed., The State as Terrorist: The 
Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1984); Amnesty International, Political Killings by Governments (London: Amnesty Inter- 
national Publications, 1983); and UN document E/CN.4/1987/20. 
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that even very wealthy societies are likely to find better uses for scarce public 
resources. But such limiting cases-which exist for all rights-must be the 
exception only. Protection of the right to life requires not only that state 
officials refrain from threatening the lives of citizens, but also that police, 
prosecutors, courts, and any other necessary institutions, take positive action 
to assure that citizens are safe from threats of violence, regardless of their 
source. 
The right to life may be a prerequisite to the enjoyment of all other 
rights. It is, however, such a minimal guarantee of human dignity-if the 
right to life is the only right guaranteed in contemporary state societies, life 
may not necessarily be short, but it may be solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish- 
that it does not serve as much of a proxy or indicator for other human rights. 
The one partial exception is the right to protection against torture, which 
can result in death, and in every case involves the treatment of individuals 
as less than human beings. States may torture citizens while protecting their 
right to life; indeed, there are state-employed physicians in countries such 
as Chile and the Soviet Union whose job is to ensure that torturers can inflict 
the maximum amount of pain without actually killing their victims.12 But a 
moral and political ethos that rejects as illegitimate the taking of life (as 
opposed to mere judgments of expediency about when or when not to torture 
someone to death) will be one that for similar reasons rejects torture as a 
legitimate instrument of state policy. 
The Right to Food 
Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights recognizes "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living 
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing," 
as well as "the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger." The 
right to food is generally considered to be the "economic" equivalent of the 
right to life-death from starvation is no less death than if one is shot-and 
many of the arguments made above apply here too. For example, guaran- 
teeing the right to food requires analogous protections of social order as 
well as protection against both private and quasi-official theft of land and 
other resources. 
12. David Kowalewski, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," in Donnelly and Howard ed., 
note 7 above; Eric Stover and Elena O. Nightingale, Breaking Bodies and Minds (San 
Francisco: W. Freeman, 1986); Eric Stover, The Open Secret: Torture and the Medical 
Profession in Chile (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Sci- 
ence, July 1987); and UN document E/CN.4/1987/13, paras. 23-34. On the problem of 
torture more generally, see Amnesty International, Torture in the Eighties (London: Amnesty 
international Publications, 1984). 
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Although it is often argued that the right to food is more difficult for 
states to honor than the right to life, especially in poor countries, all rea- 
sonable assessments suggest that there is plenty of food in the world for 
everyone. Moreover, the right to food is at issue not only in poor countries, 
but also in rich ones such as the United States.'3 The availability of food is 
a matter of equitable inter- and intra-national distribution, less a matter of 
resource scarcity than political choice.'4 It is also increasingly a matter of 
access to land, or the deprivation of such access. From the forcible removal 
of peasants in rebel areas of Ethiopia to the marginalization of peasants in 
favor of multinational agribusiness in Central America, deprivation of land 
use is often the key to deprivation of food.'" 
Therefore, we suggest an inversion of the standard liberal account of 
the link between the right to food and the right to property (which is also 
discussed in Section 6 below). We agree with Shue'6 that the right to food 
or subsistence "trumps" the right to property, as implied, perhaps, by the 
elimination of the right to property from the 1966 Covenants, despite its 
inclusion in the 1948 Universal Declaration. Nevertheless, in a world still 
inhabited by billions of peasants, protection of a family's property or use 
rights in land may well constitute one of the best protections of the right to 
food. Similarly, the redistribution of land from large holders to peasant 
families or cooperatives may facilitate enjoyment of the right to food. Even 
very poor states, which usually lack the administrative capacity to ensure 
by direct action that all their citizens are fed, can help to protect the right 
by creating or preserving legal protection of citizens' access to land. 
This argument can be extended to individuals' rights to "property" in 
the industrialized world, where personal and social wages are the closest 
many citizens come to the ownership of "property". In such societies, state 
policies such as minimum wage or guaranteed income legislation can protect 
this essential personal "property" and ensure that citizens can obtain food. 
13. Asbjorn Eide, Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, UN document 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23; Martha H. Good, "Freedom from Want: The Failure of United 
States Courts to Protect Subsistence Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 6 (August 1984): 
355-65; and Robert Justin Goldstein, "The United States of America," in Donnelly and 
Howard ed., note 7 above. 
14. Cheryl Christensen, The Right to Food: How to Guarantee (New York: Institute for World 
Order, 1978); and Independent Commission on International Development Issues [Brandt 
Commission], North-South: A Program for Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983): 
chap. 5. 
15. Peter Niggli, Ethiopia: Deportations and Forced-Labour Camps ([West] Berlin: Berliner 
Missionwerk, January 1986); Jim Doble, Resettlement in Ethiopia: An Independent Study 
into the Plight of Ethiopia's Refugees (Toronto: Energy Probe, 1986); and Charles D. 
Brockett, "The Right to Food and United States Policy in Guatemala," Human Rights 
Quarterly 6 (August 1984): 366-380. 
16. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980): 125. 
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The Right to Health Care 
For life to be anything other than the mere minimum of brutish existence, 
access to health care is essential. Article 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes "the right of everyone 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health." The phrase "highest attainable," like the general obligation in Article 
2(1) of states parties "to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights 
to the maximum of its available resources," suggests not merely a long term 
and progressively rising requirement but also immediate demands specific 
to the resources available to each state.'7 
The right to health care requires that all medically unnecessary physical 
suffering be prevented. By "unnecessary" we mean physical suffering that 
readily available national and international'8 health care systems could pre- 
vent. For example, World Health Organization "packages" of immunization 
and public health measures have succeeded, in countries such Nicaragua, 
in reducing infant mortality rates very quickly.'9 
The right to health care is a good partial proxy for the rights of mothers 
and children to special protection. For example, in the Soviet Union the 
physically abusive manner in which the state provides birth control, through 
multiple abortions instead of contraceptive devices, has resulted in an un- 
precedented rise in the infant mortality rate in the 1970s.20 Similarly, in the 
United States-perhaps the only Western industrialized democracy not to 
provide universal child allowances, job-protected maternity leaves, and tax- 
supported universal prenatal care-infant mortality rates in some black ghet- 
tos and rural areas now rival or exceed those of many Third World countries.2' 
In addition, adequate health care cannot be made available to all mem- 
bers of a society without a comprehensive social security package. The aged, 
infirm, and unemployed, as well as mothers and children, require social 
security protection to maintain their health. Thus, a state that is genuinely 
committed to providing the basic right to health probably will also provide 
a full range of social security protections. 
Adequate safeguards of the rights to food and health care are likely to 
be mutually reinforcing. Most obviously, malnutrition can be an important 
factor in susceptibility to many diseases. Conversely, a population well 
protected against common debilitating diseases by a program of preventive 
17. Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, UN document E/CN.4/1987/17 Annex, paras. 21-28. (Reprinted 
in Human Rights Quarterly 9 [May 1987]: 122-135.) 
18. Ibid., para. 26, 29-34. 
19. Catherine Gander, "Nicaragua," in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above. 
20. Kowalewski, note 12 above, and Cullen Murphy, "Watching the Russians," Atlantic 251 
(February 1983): 51. 
21. Goldstein, note 13 above. 
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public health care may be better able to satisfy its food needs. For example, 
effective programs against water-borne diseases such as schistosomiasis (bil- 
harzia) could prevent literally hundreds of thousands from becoming need- 
lessly disabled, and thus enable them to cultivate their own food. 
MEMBERSHIP RIGHTS 
The protection of survival rights alone guarantees only the crudest anomic 
existence, a life unfit for a human being; to exist as a human being, one 
must exist as part of a community. From Aristotle to Marx it has been 
commonplace, yet absolutely essential to note that man is a social animal. 
More recently, it has been noted that women and children, too, are part of 
the community. 
The destruction of families and communities ranks high on every so- 
ciological list of state actions that "ordinary" people consider to be abusive 
of human rights.22 Families are normally a part of communities, sharing 
common ethnic features, including religious beliefs, social customs, lan- 
guages, and myths of origin or ancestry. Indeed, in many preindustrial so- 
cieties families and communities are one, since myths of extended kinship 
tie nuclear families into larger clans or tribes. In contemporary nation-states, 
symbols of patriotism and citizenship often substitute for these preindustrial 
ties to the community. 
The importance of community can also be seen in twentieth-century 
nationalist political movements and, more recently, in efforts to protect or 
resurrect the rights of indigenous hunting-gathering and agricultural societies 
in countries such as Brazil.23 Both rest on a desire to protect a community 
and its way of life from the state, other elements of society, or both. 
There are also movements demanding full inclusion in civil society for 
socially-defined "outsiders." In the Western world in recent decades, these 
have included racial and ethnic minorities, women, and most recently homo- 
sexuals. The struggle of lower caste groups in India for social and economic, 
as well as political, inclusion in society presents an especially striking ex- 
ample of recent movements to overcome invidious definitions of communal 
membership. 
We have identified two key membership rights, the protection of the 
22. Barrington Moore Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain Pro- 
posals to Eliminate Them (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970): 2; and Peter Berger, "Are Human 
Rights Universal," Commentary 64 (September 1977): 62. 
23. Marc Pallemaerts, "Development, Conservation and Indigenous Rights in Brazil," Human 
Rights Quarterly 8 (August 1986), 374-400. See also Jose R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the 
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Volume V: Conclusions, Pro- 
posals and Recommendations, UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 and Add. 4. 
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TABLE 2 
Membership Rights 
Right to Proxy for 
FAMILY Social Security (D22, E9) 
(D12, D16, E10, C17, C18, C23) Culture (D27, E15) 
Religion (D18, C18) 
Minority Culture (C27) 
Rights of the Child (C24) 
Freedom of Movement (D13, C1 2) 
Education (D26, E13, E14) 
NONDISCRIMINATION Slavery (D4, C8) 
(D1, D2, E2, E3, C2, C3) Legal Recognition (D6, C16) 
EQUAL PROTECTION Nationality (D15) 
(D7, C14, C26) Religion (D18, C18) 
Minority Culture (C27) 
Rights of the Child (C24) 
Rights of Aliens (C1 3) 
Debtors Prison (C1 1) 
Political Participation (D21, C25) 
Note: The source of each right in the International Bill of Human Rights is indicated in paren- 
theses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E = 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights). 
family and the prohibition of discrimination, which can serve as proxies for 
a number of rights enumerated in Table 2. 
Family Rights 
Protection of the family is a recurrent theme throughout the International 
Bill of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration states that "no one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family home ..." 
(Article 12), that "men and women of full age . . . have the right to marry 
and to found a family" (Article 16[1]), and that "the family is the natural 
and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society 
and the State" (Article 16[3]). The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights declares that "the widest possible protection and 
assistance should be accorded to the family, which is the natural and fun- 
damental group unit of society" (Article 10[1]), requires special protection 
for mothers before and after childbirth and for children and young persons 
(Article 10[2], [3]), and grants special protections to families with respect 
to education (Article 13[3]). The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights also prohibits interference with the family (Article 17), guarantees 
family rights in education (Article 18[4]) and reaffirms the social primacy of 
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the family and the right to marry and to found a family (Article 23). The 
pervasive presence of family rights in these documents is justified not only 
by the intrinsic importance of the family but by the wide-ranging social and 
political implications of protecting the institution of the family. 
It is important not to romanticize the family: women frequently need 
protection against abusive husbands and fathers; children often need to be 
protected against violent, psychologically abusive, or negligent parents or 
caretakers. Moreover, the very choice of partaking in or refusing family 
relations is often denied, sometimes violently. In such cases, state intervention 
to protect victims of familial abuse may be essential. 
In a somewhat different vein, many people choose not to live in tra- 
ditionally recognized family groups and others, such as homosexual couples, 
find their attempts to establish new forms of households unrecognized by 
society and the state. Such individuals need to be protected from state 
attempts to coerce them into traditional family units-or worse, to imprison 
them for their deviance. We must also remember that in a number of countries 
the state intervenes not to protect but to undermine the family. 
Labor control is one object of state interference with family relations. 
In South Africa approximately one million female domestic servants are 
expected to live away from their children, black miners are forced to live 
in single-sex residences away from families whom they may visit only one 
month of every year; and countless urban workers are forced by economic 
necessity, and until 1986 by law as well, to live away from their families. 
The state creates these conditions in order to ensure a supply of cheap black 
labor unencumbered by the responsibilities and costs of family ties.24 In 
other states, such as China, family rights are invaded when individuals are 
assigned to jobs against their will, or without consideration of their family, 
especially spousal, ties. 
A second and increasingly common motive for state interference with 
family relations is population control. In Europe and North America, polit- 
ically sensitive family planning issues usually involve decisions of couples 
or women to prevent conception or refuse to give birth. In many other 
countries, the issue is whether they are to be permitted to give birth. South 
Africa encourages birth control for blacks, while discouraging it for whites, 
and has gone so far as to threaten compulsory sterilization and abortion to 
reduce nonwhite birth rates.25 in India, abusive forced vasectomies, espe- 
cially among the Muslim population during the Emergency (1975-77), were 
24. Jacklyn Cock, Maids and Madams: A Study in in the Politics of Exploitation (Johannesburg: 
Ravan Press, 1980); Frederick Johnstone, "South Africa," in Donnelly and Howard ed., 
note 7 above; and Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: 
From Segregation to Apartheid," Economy and Society 1 (1972): 425-456. 
25. Aziza Seedat, Crippling a Nation: Health in Apartheid South Africa (London: International 
Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, April 1984): 12-13. 
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one reason for Mrs. Gandhi's downfall.26 China's one-child campaign has 
been widely resisted internally and its coercive elements have provoked 
substantial international criticism. Less well-known is the enforced steriliza- 
tion, often without anaesthetic, of young girls-some unmarried and child- 
less-in Bangladesh in the 1980s.27 
The issue of overpopulation is indeed a difficult one. With different 
social arrangements, all of the world's five billion people could be fed.28 
But new social arrangements are not likely to emerge in the short or medium 
run. Meanwhile, in many countries that do not presently meet their people's 
basic needs, population growth far outstrips economic growth. In almost all 
less developed countries, reduced population growth rates could contribute 
significantly to increased per capita incomes, and thus, make available more 
resources that might be used for satisfying basic human needs. 
Family planning, however, need not be rights-abusive. Information and 
contraceptives usually can be used instead of coercive, invasive, and even 
physically dangerous methods of population control such as forced abortions 
or sterilization. Social security provisions can both protect, and limit the 
size of, families. Old age pensions, for example, lessen the necessity of 
having large numbers of children to ensure support fortheir parents. Educating 
girls reduces the risk of early pregnancy. Child welfare provisions and health 
care improvements that ensure higher survival rates for infants also tend to 
lower the birth rate. Protection of the family, protection of the child, and 
population reduction usually can be made to coincide.29 
A third, and perhaps most important, reason for the state's interference 
with family relations is that it can operate as part of a broader effort to subvert 
private social relations, which may provide a basis of loyalty to groups and 
institutions other than the state. The family is the seat of socialization. A 
child absorbs values and customs primarily from the family, and with the 
family participates in those religious and ethnic rituals that it later comes to 
value as an adult, contributing to his or her sense of dignity and belonging. 
Totalitarian states in particular try to break down all competing loyalties that 
individuals might hold, creating anomic citizens whose only-and therefore 
easily manipulable-sense of connection to the community is through state 
created and state controlled institutions, such as party youth leagues. For 
example, in the Soviet Union, children are sometimes removed from Chris- 
tian families that "proselytize" them,30 not to protect children from indoc- 
26. Barnett R. Rubin, "India," in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above. For a fictionalized 
account of this episode, see Salman Rushdie, Midnight's Children (New York: Knopf, 1981). 
27. James C. Seymour, "China," in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above; and Shelley 
Feldman, "Women in Bangladesh," paper presented at a conference on human rights in 
Asia, State University of New York at Buffalo, March 1987. 
28. See note 14 above. 
29. Independent [Brandt] Commission, note 14 above, pp. 106-108. 
30. Kowalewski, note 12 above. 
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trination into false or reactionary beliefs, but to secure the state's place as 
the only agent or their socialization. 
The possibility of this type of state interference with family relations 
necessitates protection of the rights to culture, religion, and minority culture, 
respect for which can be assessed to a considerable extent by the level of 
respect for family rights. No less important is the liberty of families to choose 
their children's schools. This right is sometimes exercised in ways that re- 
inforce class privilege (e.g., "public" schools in England), ethnic bias (e.g., 
pressure for "all Dutch" schools in Holland31), or racial exclusion (e.g., 
"Christian academies" in the American South) and thus may undermine 
equality and nondiscrimination. Nevertheless, to argue that there is no need 
to protect the right of families to choose their children's schools is to make 
the unrealistic assumption that states can always be relied on to provide 
nondiscriminatory, equal and ethically acceptable education. The right to 
choose one's children's schools is the right not to be required to submit 
one's children to political and ethical socialization by the state. It is also 
the right to preserve one's culture, religion, and language by having one's 
children educated in schools that share these aspects on one's way of life. 
Probably the worst invasion of family rights in the practice of spying on 
families. Under Nazism, children were taught in schools to inform against 
their own parents, as were children in Stalinist Russia. In communist systems, 
such as Cuba, neighborhood Party units are often expected to provide the 
state with information concerning families included in such units. This 
method of spying was common, and effective, in China during the Cultural 
Revolution.32 
The effective preservation of family rights, therefore, is closely associated 
with the preservation of the right to privacy; of the right of families to preserve 
their ethnic customs, religion, and language; and of the rights of women, 
children, and others who are specially protected by social security measures 
(See Table 2). A state that respects the family must also protect a wide range 
of related social rights. 
In many states, however, families of a certain ethnic group or social 
status may be well protected, while others are denied protection on the basis 
of ascriptive criteria. In Japan, for example, ethnic Koreans and the descen- 
dants of those held jobs once considered defiling (such as butchers), suffer 
both legal and social discrimination.33 
31. We owe this example to Peter Baehr. 
32. Robert Conquest, Harvest of Despair (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1986); Rhoda 
Rabkin, "Cuba," in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above; and Liang Heng and Judith 
Shapiro, Son of the Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1983). 
33. Lawrence Beer, "Japan," in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above, 219; and Yuji Iwasawa, 
"Legal Treatment of Koreans in Japan: The Impact of International Human Rights Law on 
Japanese Law," Human Rights Quarterly 8 (May 1986): 131-197. 
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Moreover, while the family may be "the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society," it is only a part of society, and it is only in the context of 
society as a whole that a life of dignity is possible. The prerequisite for social 
participation is recognition of one's membership in society as an individual, 
regardless of, as well as respectful of, one's family allegiances. Thus, the 
right to family must be supplemented by the right to nondiscrimination. 
Nondiscrimination 
There are two aspects of the right to nondiscrimination. Article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration and Article 2 of both Covenants recognize that in- 
dividuals are entitled to enjoy all enumerated rights on an equal basis and 
"without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status." In addition, both Article 7 of the Declaration and Article 26 of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights state that "all persons are equal before 
the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection 
of the law." Both the general principle of the equal enjoyment of all rights 
and the special legal principle of equal protection support the conclusion 
that from a human rights perspective, human dignity is fully respected only 
where individuals are treated as fully equal members of society. 
Race, color, and sex are accidents of birth, ascribed criteria over which 
the individual has no control. Religion is also frequently considered to be 
given to a child at birth, although changes in religion are commonplace. 
The principle underlying prohibitions of discrimination on such grounds is 
clear: the moral worth of human beings is not in any way connected with 
such natural accidents; no one should suffer for characteristics over which 
he or she has no control. Social status ascribed at birth, which likewise rests 
on circumstances beyond the individual's control, is also prohibited grounds 
for discrimination. For example, victims of India's caste system-those at 
the very bottom who are still socially, although not legally, viewed as "un- 
touchables"-should be protected from discrimination.34 
Protecting full membership in society for all, however, also requires 
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of certain acquired characteristics. 
For example, political opinions and property are at least partially under the 
individual's control. The Covenants' prohibition of nondiscrimination on 
these grounds is an assertion that individuals are fully and equally entitled 
to enjoy all human rights regardless of the choices they make concerning 
these important aspects of their lives. There is an irreducible minimum of 
34. Rubin, note 26 above; and Jack Donnelly, "Traditional Values Versus Universal Human 
Rights: Caste in India," paper presented at a conference on human rights in Asia, State 
University of New York at Buffalo, March 1987. 
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respect to which one is entitled, including in particular the full and equal 
enjoyment of all human rights, regardless of decisions one makes in these 
specified areas of protected choice. 
The right not to be discriminated against on the basis of property-which 
sets the context for Article 11 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
stating that "No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability 
to fulfill a contractual obligation" (prohibition of debtors' prisons)-is par- 
ticularly interesting in this regard. Taken seriously, this provision would 
protect not only persons of real or alleged "bourgeois" origin in radically 
communist regimes, but also the poor in all societies. Its point is that one's 
human dignity, one's intrinsic worth as a person, supersedes the law of 
contract or normative evaluations of the individual's responsibility to take 
the consequences of his or her own actions. Even if the poor are poor as a 
result of their own activities, they remain equally entitled to enjoy all human 
rights; even if perfect equality of opportunity existed, those who failed to 
take advantage of the opportunities available to them would still be protected 
from discrimination on the basis on property. 
Furthermore, the principle of nondiscrimination prohibits such practices 
as "pawning" (giving oneself or a relative to another person for a certain 
period of time in payment of a debt), which occurs in some African societies, 
or debt peonage or bonded labor, which persists in India. A person should 
not be treated as a piece of property, even for a limited period of time, as 
a consequence of economic misfortune, or even improvidence.35 
As indicated in Table 2, the right to nondiscrimination can stand for a 
variety of other rights as well. A state properly abiding by the principles of 
nondiscrimination and equal protection almost certainly will also protect 
the right to legal recognition and the right not to be held in slavery. Assuming 
that political participation is permitted, it will also protect the right to par- 
ticipate in political activities and to seek and hold office on a nondiscrimi- 
natory basis. A policy of nondiscrimination, along with effective protections 
of the right to a family, should also protect the rights of children, who would 
have rights commensurate with their status as minors. In conjunction with 
35. Banning discrimination on the basis of acquired characteristics widens the scope of political 
action in pursuit of rights, and suggests the need to extend the list of prohibited grounds 
in Article 2 of the Covenants. The gay liberation movement, for example, is not completely 
analogous to the civil rights or women's movements, which are pursuing equal rights for 
persons suffering discrimination on the basis of biological birth characteristics over which 
they have no control. Although homosexuality seems to be at least in part the result of 
hereditary or environmental factors beyond the individual's control, many opponents of 
equal rights for homosexuals still assume that sexual preference is a matter of personal 
choice, and some gay activists, especially in the lesbian rights movement, agree that choice 
is involved. But even if homosexuality were demonstrated to be an acquired (chosen) 
rather than ascribed (uncontrollable) characteristic, the precedents noted above suggest 
that it should not be the basis for discrimination-even if the choice deeply offends large 
sectors of the population and traditional community values. 
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TABLE 3 
Protection Rights 
Right to Proxy for 
HABEAS CORPUS (D9, C9) Torture (D5, C7) 
Arbitrary Arrest (D9, C9) 
Ex Post Facto Laws (D11, Cl 5) 
Presumption of Innocence (D11, C14) 
Rights of Detainees (C10) 
Political Participation (D21, C25) 
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY Torture (D5, C7) 
(D10, C14) Legal Remedy (D8, C2) 
Access to Courts (D10, C14) 
Political Participation (D21, C25) 
Note: The source of each right in the International Bill of Human Rights is indicated in paren- 
theses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E = 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights). 
the protection of family, and freedom of the press and association, a policy 
of nondiscrimination would protect the right to practice one's own religion 
and preserve one's culture. Furthermore, if the prohibition against discri- 
mination on the basis of property were taken seriously, it would serve as a 
further protection of the right to food and adequate health care. It might 
also ensure that if discriminatory laws and practices against, for example, 
blacks in South Africa or the United States, were ended, previously existing 
forms of racial discrimination could not simply be transformed into a new 
class discrimination with a substantial racial overlap. 
PROTECTION RIGHTS 
Even if a state were to protect survival rights and guarantee to all full rights 
of membership in society, individuals might still be subject to a wide range 
of abuses by the state, including arbitrary arrest and detention and prose- 
cution under ex post facto laws, so long as such practices did not reflect 
invidious discrimination. A life of dignity thus requires the observance of 
what we have termed "protection" rights. They might also be called legal 
or judicial rights, for their principal thrust is to establish the rule of law and 
to provide judicial review of governmental action. 
We contend that the rights to habeas corpus and an independent judiciary 
serve as indicators for this fairly diverse set of rights. As these rights are 
familiar and relatively uncontroversial, our exposition will be brief. Since 
they are closely connected, representing two sides of the process of judicial 
review, they will be discussed together. 
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration, in its entirety, reads "No one 
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shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." Article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adds, among other pro- 
visions, the rights to be informed of the charges when arrested, to challenge 
the lawfulness of any detention and receive compensation for unlawful arrest 
or detention, to be released from custody while awaiting trial, and to be 
brought before a judge and tried "within a reasonable time" or be released. 
The right of habeas corpus, which requires the state to bring detainees 
before a judge or court to determine the lawfulness of their detention, lies 
at the heart of these protections,36 which seek to ensure that the criminal 
law does not become an arbitrary instrument of oppression in the hands of 
the state, especially the executive. To ensure that the writ of habeas corpus 
is not just a formality, judges must have the power to order the release of 
prisoners; it is not sufficient, as is provided for in most Preventive Detention 
Acts in English-speaking Africa, that they merely "advise" the President about 
the legitimacy of detention.37 Moreover, judicial review of detentions must 
also be used to enforce the requirement of a speedy trial, to prevent anyone 
from languishing in detention merely at the behest of the executive agencies 
of the state. 
To assure procedural regularity, even by the right to habeas corpus, the 
judiciary must be independent and effective. The judge to whom detentions 
must be justified must be an officer of the law, not a dependent agent of 
those whose behavior he or she is required to review. As Article 14 of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights puts it, "everyone shall be entitled 
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law." Article 10 of the Universal Declaration uses 
almost the same words. In Anglo-American political thought, this principle 
has usually been expressed in terms of the separation of powers; in the 
United States, the language of checks and balances is also regularly used. 
The need for protection rights arises from the paradoxical relation of the 
state to the enjoyment of human rights. The state is indispensible to the 
effective implementation of all human rights, as we have seen in some detail 
with respect to those rights discussed above. The concentration of power 
required to assure such protection, however, poses perhaps the greatest threat 
to those rights. Since the state cannot be eliminated without disastrous human 
rights consequences, it must be controlled. 
Part of that control must come from outside the government, from "so- 
ciety." Such "external" control in the form of empowerment rights, is dis- 
cussed below. But there must also be "internal" checks on governmental 
36. Habeas corpus is a distinctly Anglo-American practice. There are, however, roughly an- 
alogous provisions in many other legal systems. We use "habeas corpus" here not in the 
strictest technical sense of the term but rather as a convenient verbal shorthand for "the 
right to protection against arbitrary arrest or detention." 
37. Rhoda E. Howard, Human Rights in Commonwealth Africa (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1986): 152-159. 
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power that are built into the day-to-day operation of the state. These are 
provided by what we call protection rights. 
The most effective internal checks require the separation of the functions 
and powers of government and the conferral of independence on the courts 
so that they may watch over and review the actions of other branches of 
the government. If such internal controls are to be effective, the judiciary 
must be a genuinely independent branch of government, a point underscored 
by the attacks on the courts conducted in most newly established repressive 
regimes, such as Marcos' assault on the judiciary during the consolidation 
of martial law in the Philippines.38 
The preservation of human rights, however, requires that courts have 
the ability to do more than form independent judgments of whether or not 
there has been an infraction of the law. Unless a judiciary has the power to 
overrule the actions of the executive on substantive, as well as procedural, 
grounds-for example, the power to interpret and apply the constitution in 
order to overturn rights-abusive statutes-its independence will be of little 
value in the long run, especially in the face of a careful and committed 
repressive regime. Without such powers of substantive review of law, policy, 
and practice, even the most dedicated and independent of judges can act 
only against arbitrary or careless violations of human rights. 
For example, the South African judiciary has a long tradition of integrity 
and independence, but during the course of Nationalist rule its influence 
over policy and practice has been steadily diminished through legislation 
that legalizes mass and flagrant violations of most human rights. So long as 
the government is relatively punctilious, it can circumvent effective judicial 
control. In the summer of 1986, to cite but one of many instances, the courts 
overturned key emergency legislation, but the government simply redrafted 
the measures so as to avoid their earlier technical errors. Similarly, judges 
are powerless to prevent-in fact, are required to approve--"judicial" ex- 
ecutions (murders) of ordinary citizens and human rights activists. 
Likewise, one of the distinctive features of Soviet rule after Stalin has 
been the institutionalization of repression through law. As in South Africa, 
violations of human rights occur less often as the result of procedural irregu- 
larities than as an effect of substantive law. Nearly all dissidents in prison 
or in exile have been tried and convicted, by the book, of violating duly 
promulgated laws. It is the laws themselves that are abusive of human rights. 
We contend that the power of substantive review is implicit in the 
requirement that courts be impartial and independent. The judiciary must 
be able to rule on the human rights consequences of any legislation. Nonethe- 
less, the power of substantive review is not a part of most legal systems (it 
38. Claude, note 9 above. 
1988 Assessing Performance 233 
exists only to a limited extent even in Britain and France), and it is not 
explicitly required by either the Universal Declaration or the Covenants. 
Furthermore, the principal remedy for laws that are violative of human rights, 
even in a system whose judiciary possesses the greatest powers of judicial 
review, lies not in the internal checks provided by protection rights, but in 
the external checks that we have termed "empowerment rights." These are 
discussed in the following section. 
The limited scope of protection rights, however, should not obscure their 
fundamental importance. In fact, it underscores the essential theoretical point 
that the protection afforded by the recognition of any human right or group 
of rights, no matter how important, is severely limited in the absence of 
safeguards for related and equally fundamental rights. Thus, we insist that 
all human rights are inherently interdependent and indivisible. 
The protection rights of habeas corpus and judicial review are good 
proxies for a variety of other legal or civil rights, noted in Table 3 above. 
The principle of the rule of law prohibits the use of ex post facto laws. 
Together, habeas corpus and an independent judiciary go a long way toward 
assuring the availability of legal remedies for violations of rights; an inde- 
pendent judiciary in particular is a necessary (although not sufficient) con- 
dition for the existence of effective remedies against governmental infringe- 
ments of rights. Habeas corpus and judicial review are also essential 
mechanisms for action against torture and other violations of the rights of 
those subject to detention. Furthermore, we are aware of no legal system 
where habeas corpus and an independent judiciary are well established but 
the presumption of innocence is not generally secured; in practice, govern- 
ments that widely presume the guilt of those they detain also infringe upon 
judicial independence or deny habeas corpus. 
We must also note the potential contribution of these protection rights 
to the assurance of all the other key rights that we have identified. Without 
protection rights, no other rights are secure against infringement by the 
modern state; without the internal checks they provide, the enjoyment of 
other rights rests on little more than good faith of the government and 
whatever external constraints it might face. 
Protection rights have a particularly important role in safeguarding the 
right to political participation. Persons involved in political activity directed 
against, or not approved by, the government are likely to be the principal 
targets of the kinds of abuse of governmental power that protection rights 
seek to prevent or overturn. By protecting the government's political op- 
ponents against most arbitrary abuses of state power, protection rights can 
contribute greatly to the creation of a public space for political action.39 
39. Compare Richard Kiwanuka, "On the Paucity of Human Rights NGOs in Africa," Human 
Rights Internet Reporter 11 (November 1986): 11. 
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EMPOWERMENT RIGHTS 
What is lacking so far in our account is any sense of people as active, creative 
beings in charge of, or at least struggling to shape, their lives. People must 
not simply be protected against attacks by the state or other citizens, they 
must be empowered to act and to lead autonomous lives. All the rights 
previously discussed are principally passive protections; the individual is 
the beneficiary of the right, but not the central actor in the struggle to realize 
human rights. This central role for the individual is provided only by em- 
powerment rights. And without positive empowerment, even the rights dis- 
cussed above are likely to be precarious. 
Empowerment rights provide what we referred to above as "external" 
checks on state power. The internal checks of protection rights only assure 
that irregular procedures are not used against individuals or groups by the 
state. Unless individuals, separately and collectively, are able to shape these 
procedures-to set the rules of the game, and not merely be assured that 
the rules are applied as written-oppression is still a very real possibility, 
as is clearly illustrated in the examples above of the Soviet Union and South 
Africa. 
We argue that the three central empowerment rights are the rights to 
education, freedom of the press, and freedom of association. The key to 
social action in defense of rights, in our view, is an educated citizenry, able 
TABLE 4 
Empowerment Rights 
Right to Proxy for 
EDUCATION (D26, E13, E14) Culture (D27, E15) 
Minority Culture (C27) 
Thought, Conscience, Religion (D18, C18) 
Freedom of Opinion (D19, C19) 
Political Participation (D21, C25) 
FREE PRESS (D19, C19) Thought, Conscience, Religion (D18, C18) 
Freedom of Opinion (D19, C19) 
Political Participation (D21, C25) 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION Free Trade Unions (D23, E8, C22) 
(D20, C22) Social Security (D22, E9) 
Work (D23, D24, E6, E7) 
Assembly (D20, C21) 
Thought, Conscience, Religion (D18, C18) 
Freedom of Opinion (D19, C1 9) 
Political Participation (D21, C25) 
Note: The source of each right in the International Bill of Human Rights is indicated in paren- 
theses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E = 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights). 
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to spread its ideas and to organize in defense of its rights.40 We do not include 
a separate right to take part in government or public affairs, for reasons 
discussed at the conclusion of this section. 
The Right to Education 
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration and Article 13 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognize the right of 
everyone to education, including free and compulsory primary education 
and access to secondary, technical, and higher education on the basis of 
merit and, to the extent possible, without cost to the student. The right to 
attend schools not run by the state is also recognized. 
Empowerment rights are concerned principally with the goals of personal 
autonomy and efficacy; they allow the individual to determine the shape 
and direction of his or her life. Education provides much of the basic in- 
tellectual capacity that enables the individual to think seriously and critically 
about what it means to live a good life; to examine and appraise actions, 
institutions and ideas; and to choose a course of action on the basis of such 
appraisals. 
Schools are often used as an instrument of social control rather than 
personal liberation, as a mechanism to enforce intellectual conformity rather 
than foster creativity and autonomy. Nonetheless, there is the potential for 
subversion in even highly coercive and controlled systems of education, as 
is illustrated by the disproportionate representation of the relatively well 
educated among political dissidents in North, South, East, and West alike. 
No matter how controlled the curriculum, the skills developed in educational 
institutions can be applied to the development of ideas other than those 
sanctioned by the state. 
Beyond the liberating potential of education, we have chosen the right 
to education as a key measure of national human rights performance because 
of its links to other empowerment rights. Freedom of the press, and the 
political empowerment for which it stands, is made far more significant by 
education; education creates an audience capable of being informed and 
mobilized and is absolutely essential to those who would write. Education 
similarly magnifies the possibilities for and the impact of trade unions and 
other associations. We will return to these points below. 
The right to education can be crucial to creating a private space for 
intellectual autonomy, especially where schools not controlled by the state 
are easily accessible. As discussed above, the potential for education to be 
40. Compare Robert Justin Goldstein, Political Repression in 19th Century Europe (Beckenham, 
Kent: Croom Helm, 1983); and David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983): 35-36. 
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used in criticism of the state can be greatly enhanced when education is 
under the control of the family. Conversely, education can be a way to 
strengthen and protect membership rights. This mutual reinforcement is 
characteristic of all the empowerment rights. 
At minimum, the right to education would guarantee to all access to 
the skills and knowledge needed for full membership in society. For example, 
in the contemporary world one cannot fully participate in society (or the 
types of participation available are seriously restricted) if one is illiterate. 
More broadly, one's options are limited if one does not have access to the 
cultural models, forms, examples, and information of the society: for ex- 
ample, the accent and idiom, the cultural and historical points of reference, 
and the norms of civility of the dominant or mainstream groups in society.41 
In modern and modernizing societies, formal education is usually the stan- 
dard way to acquire such essential skills and information. 
Education also increases one's opportunities to take part in the cultural 
life of a society, and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress, important 
rights recognized in Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. In fact, the link between education and these 
cultural rights is so close that we would argue that in most instances the 
right to education, combined with family rights and the right to nondiscrimi- 
nation, provides a reliable indicator of their status. 
Education can also make important contributions to social mobility and 
thus to combatting class-based discrimination. In developing countries there 
is substantial evidence to show that even basic literacy contributes substan- 
tially to an individual's integration into a modern economy and to his or 
her ability to take advantage of the opportunities it offers.42 And in almost 
all countries, education is one of the few ways for a poor child to move 
rapidly up the social ladder. This is true even in countries with strong class 
or status hierarchies; even taking into account problems of differential access, 
education is likely to be one of the few resources available that will allow 
one to break into or through the hierarchy. 
Finally, education can be important even to the protection of survival 
rights. An effective health care system requires that people be aware of 
public health dangers. Disseminating information, for example, on methods 
for treating or avoiding parasite-infested water, is much easier and cheaper 
if the public is literate. Similarly, technical improvements in agricultural 
methods, which can increase food production, are more easily disseminated 
to the literate. As Frances Steward puts it, "education is an important factor 
in determining [basic needs satisfaction] at all income levels."43 
41. See, for example, Richard Rodriguez, Hunger of Memory: The Education of Richard Rod- 
riguez (Boston: D. R. Godine, 1983). 
42. Christopher Colclough, "The Impact of Primary Schooling on Economic Development: A 
Review of the Evidence," World Development 10 (March 1982): 167-186. 
43. Frances Steward, Basic Needs in Developing Countries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni- 
versity Press, 1985): 96. 
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Freedom of the Press 
Articles 1 8 and 19 of the Universal Declaration, which are closely paralleled 
by the same articles of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recognize 
a cluster of rights that we will argue can be largely subsumed under the 
right to freedom of the press. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
These rights give considerable substance to the abstract idea of intel- 
lectual autonomy discussed above. One may think whatever one wants. 
One may hold whatever opinion one wants. And one may freely express 
one's thoughts, opinions, and beliefs. Furthermore, one is free to manifest 
his or her religious beliefs individually and collectively, both in private and 
in public. 
As we noted above, education helps to give force and practical meaning 
to these freedoms by providing resources with which one may form or 
develop, rather than just receive, beliefs and opinions. The freedoms of 
thought, conscience, religion, belief, and opinion protect the fruits of intel- 
lectual autonomy, which is the goal of the right to education. And the right 
to a free press, understood broadly as a right to freedom of expression through 
any medium, allows one to begin to act on these beliefs. Words, expressed 
in public, often are the first step towards deeds. Thus, we would argue that 
the rights to freedom of conscience, religion, belief, and opinion can largely 
be subsumed under the right to education, insofar as they represent intel- 
lectual empowerment, and under the rights to a free press and freedom of 
association, insofar as they represent political empowerment. 
Freedom of the press44 allows one to advocate one's ideas and thus 
attempt to see them realized. Freedom of expression is of little value if those 
who wish to express their ideas are denied access to either publicly or 
privately owned channels of communication. There is no real freedom of 
expression if one is prevented from speaking to one's target audience, or at 
least those who wish to hear; those without access to the media are not 
really free to express their views. Similarly, those who are denied access to 
44. Our concentration on the press, and thus on public speech to the general neglect of private 
speech, can be further justified by the fact that we are aware of no government hat allows 
public expression of beliefs or opinions but controls the private expression of those beliefs 
or opinions (although many do allow private expressions that are prohibited or severely 
controlled in public). 
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the views of others do not really enjoy the freedom to hold opinions without 
interference. 
Clearly, then, a free press is also crucial to the right to political participa- 
tion. In particular, a free press is essential to effective political action aimed 
at effecting changes in government or its policies. Whether that action in- 
volves electoral politics or helps to put pressure on decision-makers with 
respect to a particular policy or decision, the closing of the media precludes 
virtually all but a small elite with direct access to the government from 
having a significant political impact. 
Finally, freedom of the press can be crucial to ensuring respect for all 
other rights: by publicizing actions of the state it helps to mobilize advocates 
of change. Violations of human rights are less likely to occur or to continue 
if they can be effectively publicized, and less likely to begin if the violator 
knows that his actions may become widely known. This is especially true 
where state action is subject to review by an independent judiciary. Con- 
versely, even an independent judiciary is likely to be hamstrung where the 
flow of information is tightly controlled. We also note that responsible gov- 
ernments are likely to find a free press an invaluable source of information 
about popular views of their policies. 
Freedom of Association 
The right to freedom of association, recognized in Article 20 of the Universal 
Declaration and Article 22 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
entails the right to form associations; to formulate association policies and 
make them known; and to use legitimate tactics such as public assembly, 
recourse to the press, and the formation of political parties to exert pressure 
upon the state to adopt particular policies. Thus, under freedom of associa- 
tion, we group the rights to free trade unions, freedom of assembly, and 
political associations such as political parties (although a right to form politi- 
cal parties is not explicitly mentioned in either the Universal Declaration or 
the Covenants). 
In the industrialized world, free trade unions are perhaps the most im- 
portant manifestation of the right to freedom of association. Union activities 
on behalf of workers' interests are often essential to the effective protection 
of economic rights. But trade unions perform an equally important political 
function, through direct participation in the electoral process (e.g., the Trade 
Union Congress' central role in the British Labour Party), indirect but regular 
political linkages (e.g., the close association between many liberal Democrats 
and the AFL-CIO in the United States), and as an organized social force 
outside of government, a role that was especially important in nineteenth 
and early twentieth century Europe in bringing about the rise of the welfare 
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state. The potential political power of organized labor is underscored by the 
extensive repression of workers' organizations in the United States and Can- 
ada well into the twentieth century,45 and in the Soviet bloc right up to the 
present, as the example of Solidarity so vividly indicates. 
In the nonindustrialized world as well, trade unions are increasingly 
important political organizations, despite the fact that many are incorporated 
into state structures, as in, for example, Mexico or Tanzania.46 Literate, 
centralized, and organizationally crucial workers in primary industries and 
services can bring entire economies to a standstill, even in countries where 
85 percent of the population still lives off the land. 
In addition to trade unions, peasants' unions and other free economic 
associations have a key role to play in the nonindustrialized world, even 
though their organization is much more difficult, given the dispersed nature 
of peasant populations and the lower rates of literacy among rural peoples. 
During the short political thaw in China in 1978 through 1979, peasants 
from isolated, extremely poverty-stricken hinterland areas suddenly appeared 
in the capital demanding to be heard. The speed of the crackdown against 
them and other politically active groups, especially students, revealed the 
government's fear of real protest.47 Similarly, literate peasants in Guatemala 
have been special targets of government terror.48 
The political, at times even revolutionary, potential of organizations 
formed initially to effect economic change not only underscores the artifi- 
ciality of the distinction between economics and politics, but indicates that 
political empowerment is implicit in the right to freedom of association. 
Freedom of association protects any voluntary organization that mediates 
between citizen and state, and thus helps to insulate individuals from the 
power of the state. More importantly, people acting in concert have more 
strength to resist state action than individuals acting alone, even in great 
number. 
Human rights are protected in practice in state societies only through 
the constant political involvement of a large number of groups, most of 
which are concerned only with particular rights and interests pertinent to 
their own situations. These include communal or ethnic organizations, such 
45. Robert Justin Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America from 1870 to the Present 
(Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1978), chap. 1; and Thomas Berger, Fragile Freedoms: 
Human Rights and Dissent in Canada (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1982): chap. 5. 
46. Peter Worsley, The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1984): 226-27; and Rhoda E. Howard, "Third World Trade Unions as 
Agencies of Human Rights: The Case of Commonwealth Africa," in Trade Unions and the 
New Industrialization of the Third World, ed. Roger Southall (London: Zed Press, 1988). 
47. Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, After the Nightmare: A Survivor of the Cultural Revolution 
Reports on China Today (New York: Knopf, 1986). 
48. Bowen, note 10 above. 
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as caste associations in India; religious institutions and organizations, and 
"base communities" and other groups associated with "liberation theology" 
in Latin America; women's groups; and other groups. Most associations act 
on behalf of limited constituencies. But together they have a common interest 
in freedom of association, and through that, political participation. A state 
that protects freedom of association, therefore, protects the right of many 
diverse groups of citizens to enter and influence the political arena. 
Freedom of association is a good proxy not only for the right to political 
participation, but also for the right to work, which we understand as not 
merely the right to earn a wage, but the ability to choose and to influence 
the conditions of one's labor. In our view, the right to work requires freedom 
of association for workers. In the Soviet Union, for example, jobs are officially 
guaranteed, but in practice they are contingent on political conformity: 
political dissidents, unauthorized artists, musicians and writers, Jews seeking 
to emigrate, and evangelical Christians are regularly deprived of professional 
positions and assigned to menial tasks-or worse; the right to work for some 
Soviets means only the right to toil in slave labor camps. 
The right to work should be the right to find satisfying work, under 
conditions that are not intrinsically uncomfortable, displeasing, or exploit- 
ative, not merely the right to labor for a wage. The right to work ought to 
include the right to make use of one's creative capacities, not merely the 
right to supply labor power to the endeavors of others. But workers tend to 
be regarded merely as human capital, exploitable and reducible to their 
intellectual and/or muscular capacities, unless they have free trade unions 
to defend their interests-which brings us back to the political dimensions 
of freedom of association. The right to work may protect one and one's 
family against economic deprivation; if satisfying work is available, it may 
even contribute to a sense of personal worth and achievement. But without 
a right to organize in order to shape the conditions and terms of labor, and 
ultimately the socioeconomic structure of society, it is inadequate. 
Freedom of association is also a good proxy for several other rights, as 
indicated in Table 4. Governments which permit free and politically active 
trade unions, as well as other types of organizations, are more likely to grant 
social security rights. For example, in nineteenth century Europe, welfare 
rights were obtained only after workers had the legal and real capacity to 
organize.49 Freedom of assembly consists largely of the right to associate, 
on a regular or irregular basis, in public. Public demonstrations can have a 
powerful political impact, as illustrated by the Philippines in 1986 and South 
Korea in 1987. And, like freedom of the press, one of the principal uses of 
the freedom of association is likely to be to support and defend the freedoms 
of thought, conscience, religion, and opinion. 
49. Goldstein, note 39 above. 
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Political Participation and Multiparty Systems 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of our short list of rights is the absence 
of the right to political participation, or, as Article 21 of the Universal Declara- 
tion puts it, "the right to take part in the government of his country, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives." The right to electoral participation 
in particular is explicitly included in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration 
and Article 25 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nonetheless, 
despite our emphasis on empowerment rights, we have not included political 
participation as a key right, both because of the extreme ideological con- 
troversy over the meaning of this right and because it is likely to be redundant 
if the rights to a free press and freedom of association, along with the 
protection rights to habeas corpus and an independent judiciary, are re- 
spected. We contend that the substance of the right to political participation 
is better encompassed by the four protection and empowerment rights iden- 
tified above than by the vague, controversial, and relatively easily abused 
notion of "free elections," or, as the Covenant puts it, "genuine periodic 
elections." 
What is a "free" or "genuine" election? Consider the following cases. 
In El Salvador in 1985 all citizens were required to vote in a fairly open 
contest between the center and the right, but with the principal leftist party 
excluded by law. Abstention, however, was likely to be considered by the 
police, the military, or the death squads to be a sign of disloyalty. In Nicaragua 
at roughly the same time the parties of the right chose to boycott the election, 
but opposition parties that did participate were able to garner roughly a third 
of the vote.so In most of the Soviet bloc countries, voting is compulsory and 
voters are asked simply to approve party-selected candidates. In Kenya during 
the 1970s, despite a de facto one party political system, significant numbers 
of unpopular incumbents were turned out of office."5 In the United States 
today, elections are completely free but in practice one has a choice between 
center and center-right parties; there is no viable leftist or even social- 
democratic, option. In Senegal in the late seventies, voters were offered 
choices among candidates from three, but only three, state-sanctioned par- 
ties, which were required by law to represent particular ideological view- 
points.52 In the Philippines, all elected Presidents, including Corazon Aquino, 
have come from two families.53 
All of these elections have been called free and genuine by their sup- 
porters and shams by their detractors-and there is at least a kernel of truth 
50. Liisa Lukkari North, "El Salvador," in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above; and Gander, 
note 19 above. 
51. Howard, note 36 above, 139. 
52. Martin Klein, "Senegal," in Donnelly and Howard ed., note 7 above. 
53. Claude, note 9 above. 
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in each characterization. Therefore, given the seemingly unavoidable con- 
troversy surrounding the definition of "genuine periodic elections" in the 
contemporary world, and the feasibility of effectively protecting the right to 
political participation through protection of the rights to habeas corpus, a 
free press, freedom of association, and the preservation of an independent 
judiciary, we do not include in our short list a separate right to electoral 
participation. 
A brief comment on the right to multiparty elections is probably in order, 
though, given the emphasis placed on this right by well-known organizations 
such as Freedom House, and by many other groups in the West, particularly 
those on the political right. It is important to note that neither the Universal 
Declaration nor the Covenants include or even imply a right to multiparty 
elections. There is also a serious danger of rigid formalism in relying on 
such a measure of political rights and participation. 
We agree that, all other things being equal, an open, multiparty, com- 
petitive system allows for more genuine political participation than a no 
party or a one party system. Likewise, a multiparty system in which no parties 
are excluded from participating allows for more genuine political partici- 
pation than one in which some are excluded by law. In a multiparty system, 
it is possible for voters to oust the government and substitute a new set of 
leaders. In a one party system, even one which allows a genuine choice of 
candidates, replacement of the government is not possible. 
Nevertheless, one party systems can allow for greater or lesser degrees 
of political participation. Ideological conformity may be either required or 
irrelevant; candidates for office may be nominated either from above or by 
local committees; there may be several candidates, or only one, for the office 
of president.54 Mexico is a good example of a de facto one party state in 
which opponents and the interests they represent are usually (although not 
always) coopted into the party, which is defined less in ideological than 
organizational terms. The relatively open or closed nature of an official ruling 
party in a noncompetitive system must be considered in any serious eval- 
uation of the extent of political participation. 
Moreover, real multiparty political competition is not possible without 
the prior establishment of other rights. This is especially relevant to the 
evaluation of the human rights records of newly emerging Third World states. 
In Uganda, for example, the central human rights objective is to restore the 
most basic right of life. It may be that the only successful way to do this, in 
a severely fragmented society, is through the formation of a single ruling 
party incorporating elements from all regional and ethnic groups. The pres- 
ence of competitive political parties can be a mere cover for intra-elite 
factional infighting in societies in which the majority of the people are still 
54. Howard, note 36 above, 140-144. 
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TABLE 5 
Other Rights 
A. International Order 
ALIENS (C13) 
ASYLUM (D14) 
MOVEMENT (D13, C12) 
NATIONALITY (D15) 




SELF-DETERMINATION (El, C1) 
Note: The source of each right in the International Bill of Human Rights is indicated in paren- 
theses, by article number and document (D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights; E = 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; C = International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights). 
illiterate and disorganized and perceive politics mainly as patron-client re- 
lations. Nigerian regional politics is a case in point. 
The formal existence of multiple political parties in and of itself does 
not assure effective implementation of the right to political participation. 
Thus, both for reasons of economy and in order to avoid interpretative 
controversies of a sort that attach to none of our other key rights, we close 
our list of rights at ten and exclude the right to a multiparty political system. 
OTHER AND ANOMALOUS RIGHTS 
We have subsumed most of the major rights in the International Bill of Human 
Rights under the ten rights discussed above. Nonetheless, a few remain 
unaccounted for, either in whole or in part. These fall into three groups: a 
set of five rights pertaining to nonnationals within the structure of interna- 
tional society; the right to property; and the right of peoples to self-deter- 
mination. These rights also seem to have proved troublesome for the drafters 
of the International Bill of Human Rights: of the seven, four are in the 
Universal Declaration but not the Covenants, while two are in the Covenants 
but not the Declaration; only one is in both. 
Human Rights Beyond the Nation-State 
Most substantive articles in the Declaration and the Covenants are intended 
to have universal application, and begin with phrases such as "All human 
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being are . . . ", "Everyone has the right to . . . ", "No one shall be ... " 
In fact, though, there is an underlying assumption that these provisions 
regulate relations between citizens and their governments, reflecting the 
state-centric nature of contemporary world politics and international law.55 
This state-centrism is evident in the absence of an international authority 
for the implementation and enforcement of international human rights in- 
struments.56 States accept rather grand obligations to implement the rights 
enumerated in the Covenants, but for the most part each state government 
is the sole authoritative judge of the adequacy of its efforts. The enforcement 
of human rights norms rests largely on national, not international, action. 
State-centrism is even more evident in the fact that almost all rights can 
be denied to nonnationals. For example, the derogation of economic, social, 
and cultural rights in the developing countries is explicitly permitted by 
Article 2(3) of the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights. Article 13 of 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights permits the expulsion of even 
lawfully resident aliens, so long as the expulsion is carried out according to 
law and the alien is permitted the opportunity to present arguments against 
the expulsion. In addition, although both Covenants prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of national or social origin, they do not prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of citizenship or legal nationality. 
Nonetheless, the explicit exemption of developing countries from the 
obligation to extend economic and social rights to nonnationals implies that 
developed countries are not at liberty to deny these rights to nonnationals, 
or at least to those lawfully in their territory. In addition, aliens can argue 
for protection under the manifest meaning of international human rights 
provisions that are formulated to apply to "Everyone ... " or "All persons. 
.."., Thus, the Human Rights Committee, the independent body of experts 
that monitors compliance with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
has held that aliens are entitled to all the rights in the Covenant except those 
explicitly restricted to citizens or some other group.58 The general thrust of 
55. R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press [for the Royal Institute of International Affairs], 1986): 150-52; and Richard Falk, 
"Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights," in Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New 
York: Holmes and Meier, 1980). 
56. See Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis," International Or- 
ganization 40 (Summer 1986): 599-642; and Egon Schwelb and Philip Alston, "The 
Principal Institutions and Other Bodies Founded Under the Charter," in The International 
Dimensions of Human Rights, ed. Karel Vasak and Philip Alston (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1982). 
57. Such an argument is strongly reinforced by the presence in other articles of alternative 
words clearly intended to exclude aliens: for example, Article 25 of the Civil and Political 
Covenant extends political rights (only) to "Every citizen . . " and Article 12's protection 
of freedom of movement and residence applies only to "Everyone lawfully within the 
territory of a State," thus explicitly excluding illegal aliens from this protection. 
58. Human Rights Committee, Report of the Human Rights Committee [1986], UN document 
number A/41/40: 117-19. Compare Richard B. Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in 
Contemporary International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
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the idea of nondiscrimination also seems to require the extension of full 
protection to aliens. 
The ambiguous position of aliens, however, is underscored by the re- 
striction of the right to freedom of movement to those lawfully within a 
state's territory by Article 12 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
This clearly implies a state's right to restrict the entry of any nonnational it 
wishes (except perhaps if the restriction rests on prohibited grounds for 
discrimination). Similarly, Article 12(2), (4) of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights explicitly guarantees to individuals the right to leave any 
country, but to enter only one's own country.59 The exclusion of non nationals 
is subject to even fewer limitations than their expulsion.60 The only restriction 
on the state's right to exclude nonnationals is embodied in the right of asylum, 
recognized in Article 14 of the Declaration (but not in the Covenants). 
The only provision in the entire International Bill of Human Rights that 
clearly is not restricted to a state's treatment of its own citizens is Article 28 
of the Universal Declaration: "Everyone is entitled to a social and inter- 
national order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration 
can be fully realized." The most plausible reading of Article 28 is as an 
"elastic cause," to justify future extensions of new rights. As such, it is not 
surprising that it was not included in the Covenants, which unambiguously 
impose international legal obligations and establish nationally justiciable 
rights; it is extremely rare for lawmaking treaties to include such elastic 
provisions, which to most states seem extraordinarily dangerous due to the 
unpredictability of their application. This is especially true since the reference 
to international order might imply unspecified limitations on sovereignty. 
Taken seriously, it might lead to the acceptance of human rights obligations 
and, in particular, economic obligations to other states and the international 
community. Such obligations are scrupulously avoided almost everywhere 
else in the International Bill of Human Rights. 
The struggle for a new International Economic Order or other obligatory 
mechanisms for the redistribution of international resources has given sa- 
lience to Article 28 of the International Bill of Human Rights. It is certainly 
true that some impediments to the realization of human rights lie in the 
current international political and economic order-even if, as we have 
argued above, the principal impediments are national. But Article 28 is too 
vague, too controversial, and too much contrary to the rest of the Declaration 
and the Covenants to bear much weight. Nonetheless, it does address a set 
of problems largely outside the current state-centric framework of interna- 
tional human rights norms, and thus suggests a potentially important area 
for the further development of those norms. 
59. See also UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/10. 
60. Compare Animesh Ghoshal and Thomas M. Crowley, "Refugees and Immigrants: A Human 
Rights Dilemma," Human Rights Quarterly 5 (August 1983): 327-347. 
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Human rights are the rights of each and every individual, simply as a 
human being. To make the realization and protection of these rights de- 
pendent on such arbitrary features as place of birth or the nationality of one's 
parents seems morally unjustifiable. Even it if is admitted that states are, and 
are likely to remain, the primary focus of whatever international order we 
have-that is, even if we allow that state-centrism is an international political 
fact to which even human rights norms must bend-it seems inappropriate 
to allow any of the fundamental structures of international order to interfere 
actively with the universal realization of human rights. Perhaps Article 28 
reflects a glimmer of such concerns. In general, however, state-centrism is 
overwhelmingly dominant in the International Bill of Human Rights. 
The fifth and final anomalous right in this group is the right to nationality, 
another right found in the Declaration (Article 15) but not the Covenants. 
In a world structured around sovereign states, the right to nationality is an 
essential minimum guarantee of membership in some society, and thus in 
the society of states. The right to nationality, along with the right to enter 
one's own country, assures that there is at least one place from which each 
person cannot be excluded. In a world of states, the stateless person is 
everywhere an outsider:6' as human beings, the stateless are entitled to all 
human rights, but no state takes responsibility to protect their rights, nor do 
they necessarily have the right to live in any country of the world.62 
The Right to Property 
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration reads: "1. Everyone has the right to 
own property alone as well as in association with others. 2. No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Similar provisions were discussed 
during the drafting of the Covenants, but in the end were not included 
because of an inability to achieve consensus on their formulation. 
We advocate a limited right to property, but reject any attempt to attach 
the right to property to nonhuman entities such as business corporations. 
We would also subordinate any right to property to other human rights, in 
particular the right to food and the right to work not merely for a wage, but 
also under safe working conditions and at labor suitable for a human being. 
At the same time, however, we are aware of the abuses of individual workers 
and peasants that occur when private ownership is converted into public 
(state) ownership, especially in otherwise repressive societies. State own- 
61. Compare Dorothy Jean Walker, "Statelessness: Violation or Conduit for Violation of Human 
Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 3 (February 1981): 106-123. 
62. Although Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that 
"every child has the right to acquire a nationality," in practice many children do not; for 
example, persons of Lebanese origin born in Sierra Leone, where citizenship is granted 
only to those of "negro-African" descent (Howard, note 36 above, 101) or ethnic Koreans 
born in Japan, who are legally aliens even if their families have lived in Japan for generations 
(Iwasawa, note 31 above). 
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ership and management of productive property is not necessarily a better 
protector of the rights to food and to work-or any other rights-than private 
capitalist ownership. 
Thus, we argue for the right to property under limited conditions: no 
individual or family should be deprived, either by private citizens, corporate 
entities, or the state, of the property that he or she, or the household unit, 
may own or control in order to produce food or an individual or household 
income. Nevertheless, we realize that even this principle cannot be translated 
into a hard and fast rule; for example, a family-held corporation or plantation 
could provide the family's sole source of income while employing thousands 
of workers in exploitative conditions. 
The right to property should be accepted, but as an individual human 
(not corporate or state) right. Furthermore, there should be no human right 
(although, depending on the circumstances, there may be justifiable legal 
rights) to private ownership of means of production used for the sustenance 
of large numbers of other people. 
Self-Determ i nation 
Both Covenants, in Article 1, declare that "all peoples have the right to self- 
determination" and the right to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources." This right is anomalous because it is the only right in the entire 
International Bill of Human Rights that is a right of "peoples"-meaning 
states in practice-not individuals. Academic commentators occasionally 
argue for a right of individual self-determination, but such a right, besides 
being obscure and extravagant, is not widely recognized, as demonstrated 
by the words of the Covenants. Furthermore, the "peoples" who are entitled 
to self-determination, according to accepted international practice, are only 
those currently or previously under colonial domination. The right to self- 
determination of nationalities or groups within established sovereign states 
is, for obvious reasons, strongly opposed by virtually all states.63 
For people under foreign or colonial rule, self-determination is an im- 
portant right. Normally, individuals prefer to be ruled by their "own kind" 
rather than by foreigners or outsiders. Self-determination in this sense is an 
aspect of human dignity: the knowledge that one's own people rule one's 
own country generates a sense of efficacy and pride. 
But self-determination has no meaning as a human right, as distinct from 
an international legal right, if individuals are given no right to participate in 
their own governance, if they do not act as subjects determining their own 
lives, rather than mere objects of (independent) state policies. The millions 
of refugees fleeing their "own" countries are ample evidence that many 
63. Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine of the 
United Nations (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); and Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The 
Legitimacy of Self-determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 
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people would rather live in security with strangers than in their "own" nation- 
states as victimized citizens. Homegrown oppressors may be preferable to 
foreign ones, but true self-determination requires autonomous political par- 
ticipation for all individuals. Self-determination, even for peoples rather than 
individuals, means more than a right to local despots. 
Self-determination is undoubtedly an important right, but as it is for- 
mulated in the Covenants it is at best an anomaly, and at worst not a human 
right at all but rather an international legal right of states. As it is interna- 
tionally interpreted, it is irrevelant as a protection of individuals against their 
own governments; worse, it is often used an an ideological tool for justifying, 
and deflecting outside criticism of, the abuse of citizens' human rights. 
CONCLUSION 
We have argued that ten key rights, taken together, can be used as proxies 
for almost the entire list of rights in the International Bill of Human Rights. 
This particular list certainly can be debated. For example, some commenta- 
tors64 WOuld prefer to include the right to work. Others might argue that it 
is redundant to include both the right to an independent judiciary and the 
right to habeas corpus, or both the right to food and the right to health care. 
Our views on these matters are not cast in stone. We recognize the preli- 
minary nature of this analysis. 
Nevertheless, we consider it useful to open the debate, and believe that 
our initial effort here may be both theoretically and heuristically valuable. 
Any analysis of the protection or abuse of rights-or indeed of the policy 
issues raised by a commitment to human rights-must make some choices, 
implicit or explicit, about the right upon which to focus. It is time that we 
confront directly the issues involved in such a choice. 
The next step is to take this (or a similar) framework and put it to use 
in empirical research. We hope to begin doing so ourselves in the near 
future, and hope that other social scientists will pursue similar or parallel 
lines of research. 
Useful data for most of our key rights already exist or could be made 
available from existing public data sources. We would particularly like to 
see the creation of a public data bank based on this or a similar list of key 
rights. It is also important that alternative strategies for using such data be 
tried and evaluated. These might range from large-scale, crossnational, ag- 
gregate data analysis to matched-pair comparisons involving qualitative as 
well as quantitative data, and should include a variety of intermediate and 
mixed approaches as well. Such work should bring us one step closer to 
understanding the causes of respect for, and abuse of, human rights. 
64. For example, Skalnes and Egeland, note 2 above. 
